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of a wide range of attempts to answer the problem; the latter requires the
putative instances of projective willing to be described in rich phenomenological detail. Inevitably, there will be much for readers to criticise and
disagree about; it will be for each reader to decide whether Part Two leaves
any viable option still open to the defender of eudaimonism and whether
Part Three provides compelling evidence for the reality of projective willing in Davenport’s sense. But I think there is no doubt that Davenport has
made a compelling case and has presented in rich detail a powerful alternative to a deeply entrenched way of thinking. And whether or not one
ultimately agrees with him, I think no reader could fail to learn much from
his painstaking analyses. This is a remarkable and wonderfully thoughtprovoking book.

Ontology and Providence in Creation: Taking Ex Nihilo Seriously, by Mark Ian
Thomas Robson. New York: Continuum, 2008. Pp. xi + 223. $130 (hardback).
SAMEER YADAV, Duke University Divinity School
In this ambitious work, Mark Robson attempts to unseat a venerable
philosophical tradition of understanding God’s creatio ex nihilo widely
held since its seminal articulation by Leibniz, one framed in modal terms
according to which creation consists in the actualization of a determinate
possible world. The ontological assumption for most modal theories
whose formal semantics are rooted in the Leibnizian idiom of “possibleworlds” is that all possible objects are completely determinate individuals. Thus, although I have actually composed this on a laptop, I might
have composed it on a desktop. As a way the world could have been, this
possibility is general, for I have not specified whether the desktop would
have been a PC or a Mac, or what software I would have used, and so on.
But this possibility is not thereby indeterminate, for there is a fact of the
matter about what might have been the case as regards each of these further specifications, as well as innumerable other ones. Any one maximally
specified and logically consistent description (while in practice impossible
to render explicit) would tell us exactly one way that the world logically
could have been—a possible world. Having not fully specified the state
of affairs of my having composed this review on a desktop, my assertion of the general possibility therefore includes many such determinate
possibilities, thereby expressing a range of possible worlds. Each possible
desktop in this range, as an exponent of a different possible world, is a
fully determinate individual possible object.
According to those philosophical theologians in the Leibnizian tradition
of modal ontology (and its formalized semantics post-Kripke), it is just
this sort of determinacy about possibilia that characterizes God’s exhaustive knowledge prior to creation. God’s creation of the world was simply
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the actualization of a single determinate possible world from among the
vast range of all possible worlds, wherein God’s will brought it about that
that world came to be instantiated externally to the divine mind. Hence
God’s act of creation according to this model does not accomplish any sort
of gain in determinacy between the possible and the actual, but only what
Robson characterizes as a “copying” of one particular possible world envisioned in the divine mind “out into extra-mental reality” (11). It is this sort
of creation as “copying” that Robson finds objectionable. Philosophically,
he objects to our admitting into our ontology determinate possibilia as
genuine objects of reference, whether as individuals or predicates. Theologically, he objects that a Leibnizian doctrine of creation is not genuinely
a creation out of nothing, but rather a creation out of possibilia—eternally
pre-existent entities in the divine mind. This, he thinks, gives creation
an insufficient independence from God’s determinative foreknowledge
and implies a sort of “unsurprisingness”; a lack of real novelty that undermines God’s creative capacities and his bestowal of those capacities
upon us as God’s creatures (15). In response to this, Robson offers in Part
1 (chapters 1–6) the constructive centerpiece to the book, an indeterminate
account of modality modeled on C. S. Peirce’s analysis of the mathematical
continuum and theologically interpreted as the creative capacity of the
divine will.
What, then, is a “continuum analysis” of modality, and why should we
reject the determinate conception of possibility assumed by the Leibnizian
picture? As to what is inherently problematic about the Leibnizian view,
Robson has curiously little to say. While he offers an admirably clear exposition of modern theories of modality in chapter 2, that exposition is
marked by unnecessary elaborations detailing how various metaphysical
accounts of modality differently construe the determinacy of possibilia.
This serves no clear purpose, since it is only the minimal and obvious fact
that they assume determinacy which is relevant for establishing the view
he’s rejecting. The chapter closes with a brief and hastily appropriated
recounting of Quine’s criticism that non-actual possibilia have no criterion
of individuation and Ruth Barcan Marcus’s claim that determinate possibilia lack names that can fix their reference in contexts non-coextensive
with the actual. Given Robson’s project, these criticisms should have been
developed earlier and at greater length, so that his subsequent engagement with representative modal theories could have assessed whether
influential ways of reading an ontology of determinate possibilia off of
a possible-worlds semantics can avoid these problems. Instead, he puzzlingly offers little argumentation for the inadequacy of a determinate
conception of possibilia. Remarkably, Robson simply takes the barring of
mere possibilia in Marcus’s formal semantics as an ontologically intuitive
position, whereas he thinks it altogether counterintuitive to suppose that
there is a realm of metaphysical (or broadly logical) non-actual possibilia
to which we can refer (consisting in such things as properties that are not
exemplified but might have been, states of affairs that do not obtain but
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could occur, and propositions which are false but could have been true)
(205). But if it is indeed intuitive plausibility Robson wishes to champion,
the shoe is arguably on the other foot. Marcus’s radical actualism is valid
as a formula in one system of quantified modal logic, but when abstracting it as a claim about the nature of possibility it seems obviously false.
Ordinary language is replete with what we take to be genuine references
to mere possibilia. We customarily regard propositions such as “Wittgenstein could have gotten married and had children, but instead died single
and childless” as having a truth value, even if it is never entertained by
anyone. Prima facie, it is most plausible to think that even if the occasion
to think about it never arose for anyone, Wittgenstein nevertheless in fact
could have both coupled and sired. It is equally plausible to recognize that
if this is so, then the world would have been the same in some respects
and different in others, even though a maximal specification of this is beyond our ken. It seems bizarre to think that the truth of this proposition
depends in any way on our cognition, although obviously recognizing or
formulating the proposition does. Contrary to Robson’s curious presupposition, philosophical argument is not required to establish the assumption of determinate possibilia as embedded in our everyday discourse, but
is rather required to dislodge it. But it is precisely such an argument that
he does not give us.
Robson’s alternative model for thinking about possibilia in chapters 3–5
is founded on a Piercean interpretation of Zeno’s paradox, wherein the
infinite divisibility of a line into segments illumines the problem of taking
anything essentially continuous (motion, time, etc.) to be ultimately composed of determinate individual points. Pierce rejects Cantor’s solution
for retaining a compositional interpretation of continua and generalizes
the mathematical case into a definition of possibility as having a similarly
continuous nature, i.e., providing the general conditions governing the
potential and actual realization of an individual or an aggregate of individuals, rather than fundamentally “containing” or “hiding” such entities
compositionally (45). Possibilia, then, are not unactualized determinate
individuals, propositions, properties or states of affairs, but indeterminate
continua. Thus, exhaustive knowledge of all possibilia can only be knowledge of a complex set of general conditions, and not of any such determinate objects. These latter become determinate objects of knowledge only
when the potentiality of some relevant continuum (e.g., redness) issues in
the realization of a particular (a red thing). Robson relies on Hartshorne
in applying his analysis of possibilia as indeterminate to God’s knowledge prior to creation, which, as a knowledge of possibilities, could only
have been a knowledge of unspecifiable potentiality and not a detailed
knowledge of what the actual world would be like. This he takes to imply God’s necessary learning about the world as it unfolds unpredictably
from indeterminate potentiality to determinately realized actuality. Chapter 6 argues that the indeterminacy of continua as the potentialities out of
which God created the world are best understood as divine capacities or
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powers. Possibilia are therefore not fundamentally dependent on God’s
mind but on the capacities of God’s will, which creates genuinely novel
objects whose determinate specificity is logically unavailable to the divine
mind prior to their creation.
This alternative account of possibilia is certainly intriguing, but insufficiently developed. The way in which an indeterminate continuum/power
that essentially lacks internal individuations could be said to constitute
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the realization of determinate
individuals remains altogether mysterious. This matter is made more confusing by Robson’s tendency to individuate continua in terms of singular
universals interpreted as capacities to produce particulars, such as redness
producing red objects (76). But if God’s general creative capacity is capable
of individuation into particular continua/powers ordered to predicates or
properties, then there is no principled reason (or at any rate Robson offers
none) that this particularity shouldn’t go “all the way down” so as to eliminate all generality in God’s creative power, e.g., by admitting individuating properties as capacities to create determinate individuals. Even with
possibilia thus understood as rooted primarily in the divine will, God’s
perfect self-knowledge would continue to guarantee the eternal existence
of possibilia as representations of God’s power in the divine mind which
are configurable into possible worlds. If, on the other hand, Robson backs
off of capacity-individuation and says that God’s power is essentially continuous and undifferentiated, then we could nevertheless think of God’s
mind as capable of representing the continuity of the divine will’s creative
capacity and performing the mental operation of “carving it up” into every
possible determinate configuration each of which constitutes a possible
world. His voluntarism doesn’t secure indeterminacy.
In drawing out the consequences of his model for a theory of providence in Part 2 (chapters 7–9), Robson argues that whereas the merely
“copied” objects of a Leibnizian ontology are not sufficiently independent
from God but are merely replicated features of God’s eternal mind (thereby courting a form of emanationism), his own view explains the clear
individuation of the determinate world from the indeterminacy of God’s
creative capacity (138). But this is a dubious charge which fails to appreciate both the contingency of world-actualization and the difference in kind
between properties/propositions/states of affairs and things with properties/truths/occurrences. Robson further credits a continuum analysis with
uniquely explaining the emergence of evil as something which God could
not have culpably known before actually creating, but to which God must
constantly respond in a process of continued interaction with creation.
Again, this is not divine ignorance, since prior to their determinate realization, the relevant possibilities did not exist as determinate objects of
knowledge. Evil, as a distinctly human possibility, arises from the indeterminate creative capacity of human agency which, like God’s, can produce
genuine novelty from its own indeterminate potentiality, even novelties capable of deforming God’s good creation. Part 3 (chapters 10–11)
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extends this account of human creative agency to show that although it
resembles God’s creative capacity, it crucially differs in that the novelty
(of art, literature, invention, meanings, etc.) necessarily emerges from
human interaction with pre-existing materials, whereas God’s creative
capacity is entirely self-sufficient, requiring God’s will alone. In their logical dependence upon his modal theory, both Robson’s characterization of
human freedom and his account of human creativity inherit its deficits as
articulated above. Nevertheless, this is an engaging and highly original
work that merits the serious consideration of anyone with a theological
interest in the metaphysics of modality.

The End of Philosophy of Religion, by Nick Trakakis. Continuum, 2008. Pp.
viii + 172. $120 (cloth).
VICTORIA S. HARRISON, University of Glasgow
The End of Philosophy of Religion is a book about philosophy and its practitioners. At its core lies a sobering evaluation of the current state of analytic
philosophy. Describing this form of intellectual activity as “monotonous,”
“mournful,” and “melancholic,” Trakakis clearly believes that it has outlived its usefulness (1). In keeping with this view, the current resurgence
of interest in analytic philosophy in many parts of the world is dismissed
as akin to the “long twilight of piety and nihilism” which Nietzsche predicted would follow the death of God (1).
As Trakakis explains in chapter 1, the type of philosophy whose demise
he celebrates is modeled on the natural sciences. He argues that its core problem is that, unlike the objects of natural science, the objects of philosophical inquiry are not, and never could be, rationally comprehensible. Thus,
allowing the model of natural science to shape the practice of philosophy
has led to a dead end. Trakakis compares the “endlessly futile attempts”
of analytic philosophers “to render everything rationally comprehensible”
to Ad Reinhardt’s preoccupation with painting black canvases (1). Just as
Reinhardt’s paintings were intended to symbolize the point at which no
further development in painting was possible, analytic philosophers have
reached the point at which they can make no further progress. The End of
Philosophy of Religion is a sustained attempt to persuade others to share this
view by focusing on a specific instance of this mootedly futile philosophical
enterprise, namely analytic philosophy of religion. Trakakis believes that
the failure of analytic philosophy is nowhere more apparent than in the
philosophy of religion, so he uses this sub-discipline to bring into sharper
focus his assessment of the analytic tradition as a whole.
Chapter 2 deploys the problem of evil, and the way it is typically handled by analytic philosophers of religion, to illustrate the malaise which
he believes afflicts the sub-discipline. I agree with Trakakis that writing

